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PENSION FUNDS AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION
ABSTRACT
Pension funds have played a critical role in the evolution
of the markets for debt and equity securities and their
derivatives in the U.S. over the last 15 years. The new
securities and markets can largely be explained as responses to
the investment demands of pension funds in an environment of
increased interest rate volatility and tighter regulation.
Defined benefit pension plans offer annuities that have a
guaranteed floor specified by the benefit formula. In order to
minimize the cost to the sponsor of providing this guarantee,
there is a strong incentive to invest an amount equal to the
present value of the accumulated benefit obligation in fixed—
income securities with a matching duration. The pursuit of
duration matching and related immunization strategies by pension
funds has contributed to the emergence and rapid growth of
markets for zero coupon bonds, GIC's, 010's, options, and
financial futures contracts. Recent changes in accounting rules








PENSION FUNDS AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION
OOrrtkzrrs
1. Introduction 1
2,Pension Funds as Financial Intermediaries 3
2.1 Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans ..5
3.The Nature of the DB Pension Promise 7
3.1 The Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABC) 9
3.2 The Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) 15
3.3 The Indexed Benefit Obligation (ISO) 16
4.WhyPensionPlans Do Not Provide Inflation Insurance ..19
5.WhoOwnsthe Pension Surplus' 22
6. The Corporate Pension Guarantee and Funding and
Investment Strategies 23
6.1 Immunization and Duration Matching 28
6.2 Pension Overfunding and Contingent Immunization ..29
7. Pension Fund Investment Policy in Practice 31
8. Financial Innovation as a Response to the Investment
Demands of Pension Funds 36
9. Future Innovations 40
10. Summary and Conclusions 44
Appendix: Using Derivative Securities to Convert Equity into
Debt 45
References 47TALE8
Table 1. Present Value of New Benefits Earned as a
Proportion of Salary 13
Table 2. Cumulative Value of Benefits Earned as a
Proportion of Salary 13
Table 3. sample corporation Balance Sheets 25
Table 4. Case of Unfunded Pension Plan 25
FIGURES
Figure 1 Present Value of New Benefits Earned as a
Proportion of Salary 11
Figure 2. cumulative Value of Benefits Earned as a
Proportion of Salary 12
Figure 3. Inflation and Interest Rates: 1958—1988 37Zvi Bodie
August 1989
PENSION FUNDS ANDFINANCIALINNOVATION
"It is by no means clear that the demand and supply for financial
assets by opaque institutions simply reflect retail forces. In
the prevailing equilibrium models of securities markets, demand
comes from the individuals solving portfolio optimization
problems. However, when we take account of the intervening
contractual relations under which opaque institutions operate, it
seems heroic to think that they mirror these forces."
Stephen A. Ross, "Institutional Markets, Financial
Marketing, and Financial Innovation," The Journal of
Finance, July 1989.
1. Introduction.
In the past 15 years, starting in 1974, we have seen an
unprecedented wave of financial innovation in the U.S. capital
markets. The main areas of innovation have been the
securitization and repackaging of debt and the emergence of
derivative securities markets. The purpose of thie paper is to
show how some of these developments can be explained by the
nature of the benefits guaranteed by defined benefit pension
plans and the investment strategies they employ to hedge their
liabilities.
In 1988 assets of pension plans amounted to almost $2.5
trillion, representing the largest single pool of investable
fumds. It is not surprising, therefore, that the investment
policy of pension funds has had a profound effect on the
direction and rate of innovation in the capital markets.
Perhaps the most striking development has been the esergence
of new securities and markets designed to provide long—duration
1dollar—denominated cash flows. Examples are the markets for zero
coupon bonds, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (cMO's),and
Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GIC's).'
From the perspective of household lifetime utility
maximization it is hard to see why there would be much of a
demand for such securities. Economic theory would suggest that
households want securities that hedge against the main sources of
risk to their future stream of consumption. A long-term nominal
bond has little value as a hedge against the risks faced by
households because it is so vulnerable to inflation risk.
This paper traces the demand for long-duration dollar-
denominated debt to the nature of the benefits guaranteed by
defined benefit pension plans and to the immunization strategies
they employ to hedge their liabilities. It also explains the
emergence of options and financial futures markets along similar
lines. It then explores several possible explanations for the
failure of pension plans to provide automatic protection against
inflation risk. The analysis focusses on corporate pension
plans, but most of it applies as well to state and local
government defined benefit plans.
'See Smith and Taggart [1989] for a discussion of the major
innovations in the fixed—income area.
22. Pension FundsasFinancial Intermediaries
This paper takes the view that the primary economic function
of a pension plan is to provide retirement income security to
plan beneficiaries and that the investment behavior of the
pension fund can best be understood from that perspective.2 This
is the conventional view of pensions expressed by most pension
professionals, and it is codified in the law that regulates
private pension plans in the U.s. .
Westart by thinking of an employer-sponsored pension plan
as a savings scheme for the provision of retirement income.
Through a combination of employer and employee contributions part
of the employee's total compensation during the working years is
deferred until retirement. This savings scheme can and often
does have several insurance features designed to protect the
employee against economic insecurity in retirement.
The major sources of retirement income risk that a risk—
averse employee would like to insure against are:
1.Replacement rate inadequacy— This is the possibility
that the retiree will not have enough income to
maintain the same standard of living after retiring as
during the preretirement years.
2For an elaboration of this view see Bodie [l989a].
3The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
mandates that private pension plans be operated for the exclusive
benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries. Subsequent
amendzents to ERISA have not altered this basic approach. The
leading text book on private pensions, McGill and Grubbs (1989],
seems to adopt this perspective as well.
32.Longevity— the risk that the retiree will outlive the
amount saved for the provision of retirement income.
3. social Security cuts— the risk that the benefits
provided by the Social Security retirement system will
be cut before the individual reaches retirement age.
4. Investment risk- the possibility that the amount saved
for retirement will be inadequate because the assets in
which they were invested performed poorly.
5. Inflation risk— the risk that inflation will erode the
purchasing power of retirement savings.
We can think of a corporation's pension fund as a financial
intermediary designed to provide insurance against some of these
risks. There are two basic types of pension plan: defined
contribution and defined benefit. In the case of a defined
contribution plan the fund is owned entirely by the plan
beneficiaries, the corporation's employees. In the case of a
defined benefit plan, the corporate sponsor guarantees the
liabilities of the pension fund and, in effect, shares ownership
with the employees. A defined benefit pension fund is
essentially an insurance company subsidiary of the sponsoring
corporation.
The sharing rules for defined benefit plans are very
complex,, and mostly they are implicit. The funding and
investment policies for a defined benefit plan depend on these
sharing rules, on the tax advantages offered by IRS regulations,
and on the laws governing pension plans.
42.1 Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans
Let us first distinguish more fully between the two basic
types of pension plan: defined contribution (DC) and defined
benefit (DB). The DC arrangement is conceptually the simpler of
the two.
Under a DC plan, each employee has an account into which the
employer and the employee (in a contributory plan) make regular
contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total contributions
and investment earnings of the accumulation in the account.
Contributions usually are specified as a predetermined
fraction of earnings, although that fraction need not be constant
over the course of a career. Contributions from both parties are
tax—deductible, and investment income accrues tax—free.' At
retirement, the employee receives either a lump sum or an annuity
whose size depends on the accumulated value of the funds in the
retirement account.
Often the employee has some choice ahout how to invest the
funds in the account. In principle, contributions may be
invested in any security, although in. practice most plans limit
investment options to various bond, stock, and money market.
funds. The employee bears all the investment risk; the
retirement account is by definition fully funded, and the firm
'Employee contributions are tax—deductible only if the DC plan
is structured so as to meet certain restrictions imposed by the
IRS.
5has no obligation beyond making its periodic contribution.
For defined contribution plans investment policy is not much
different than it is for an individual deciding how to invest the
money in an IRA. The guiding principle is efficient
diversification, that is, achieving the maximum expected raturn
for any given level of risk exposure. The special feature is the
fact that investment earnings are not taxed as long as tha money
is held in the pension fund. This consideration should cause the
investor to tilt the asset mix of the pension fund towards the
least tax—advantaged securities such as corporate bonds.
In a DB plan, the employee's pension benefit entitlement is
determined by a formula that takes into account years of service
for the employer and usually wages or salary. In a typical DB
plan, the employee might receive retirement income equal to 1% of
final salary times the number of years of service. Thus, an
employee retiring after 40 years of service with a final salary
of $30,000 per year would receive a retirement benefit of 40% of
$30,000, or $12,000 per year.
The annuity promised to the employee is the employer's
liability. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), an
agency of the U.S. government, guarantees the pension benefits
promised under defined benefit plans up to certain limits. Plan
sponsors pay insurance premiums that depend on the number of
employees covered by the plan and on how well funded it is.
Large corporations usually offer a defined benefit plan as
their primary pension plan and supplement it with voluntary
6defined contribution plans (called savings or profit—sharing
plans). To encourage participation the sponsor often makes
matching contributions to these supplementary DC plans, and the
employee decides how to allocate the money. When a DC plan is
the primary pension plan, however, the employee often is not
required to make any contributions, and the employer usually
makes the asset allocation decisions.
In a DE plan the assets serve as collateral for the fin's
pension liabilities. Traditionally, pension funds have been
viewed as separate from the corporation. Funding and asset
allocation decisions are supposed to be made in the best
interests of the beneficiaries, regardless of the financial
condition of the sponsoring corporation.
3. The Nature of the DB Pension Promise
The nature of the insurance provided under a defined benefit
plan varies with the specific type of plan and benefit formula.
As stated in the previous section, in plans for salaried
employees the benefits tend to be salary—related, a proportion of
either average final pay or career average pay, and the benefits
actually paid often exceed those specified by the formula.
The pensions offered under these plans are best viewed as
participating annuities that offer a guaranteed minimum nominal
benefit determined by the plan's benefit formula. This
guaranteed benefit is enriched from tine to time at the
discretion of managenent based on the financial condition of the
7plan sponsor, the increase in the living costs of retirees, and
the performance of the fund's assets.
The evidence in support of this contention is that many
plans have given ad hoc voluntary benefit increases to plan
participants in the past.5 While these increases have been
viewed by many as evidence of implicit cost-of-living indexation
they are very different from a formal COLA (cost-of-living
adjustment). We will come back to this distinction shortly.
The recent ruling by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FAS 87) regarding the reporting of corporate DB pension
obligations has recognized two different measures: the
accumulated benefit obligation (ABC) and the projected benefit
obligation (PBO). The ABC is treated as the primary measure. If
pension assets fall short of the ABO, the unfunded liability must
be reported on the corporate balance sheet. The PBO is reported
only in the footnotes to the corporation's annual report.
There is considerable controversy among investment
professionals about which of these (if either) should be seen as
the true pension liability to be hedged through pension fund
investment policy. Several experts on pension investment policy
have stated that the PBO and the ABC should both be hedged by
corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans.6 While they
5see Clark, Allen, and Sumner [1983) for a discussion of
these ad hoc increases.
5For example, see Black [19893, Arnott and Bernstein [1988],
and Atbechtsheer [1987].
8agree that the ABC is the correct measure of the termination
value of the sponsor's pension obligation, they think that the
P50 is the correct measure of its "going concern" value.
We can clarify the issues involved by considering the
following numerical example. Suppose the plan pays a benefit
equal to 1% of final salary per year of service. To keep the
mathematics simple we will make some additional assumptions that
will not affect the qualitative results we are interested in.
Plan participants enter the plan at age 25, retire at age
65, and live until age 85. There is immediate vesting, no early
retirement option, and no employee turnover. These assumptions
allow us to ignore the actuarial adjustments necessary to account
for mortality risk and turnover.
We assume that the typical employee's salary increases at
the rate of inflation. This implies no change in real wages over
an employee's career and allows us to avoid the complications
arising from any divergence between nominal wage growth and
inflation. Finally, we assume that the interest rate appropriate
for discounting nominal annuities is 9% per year (the riskless
real rate of 3% per year plus an expected rate of inflation of 5%
per year plus a risk premium of 1% per year).
3.1 The Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ADO)
Figure 1 and the second column of Table 1 show the profile
of the present value of new benefits earned (as a proportion of
salary) in each year. This is the amount the sponsor would have
9to contribute to the pension fund in order to eventually provide
the benefit caned in that year.
Figure 2 and the second column of Table 2 show the value of
the employee's accrued benefits (as a proportion of salary) at
the end of each year. It represents the amount of money that the
employee would be entitled to if the plan were terminated or if
the employee left at that time. In other words, it is the ABO.
The profile in Figure 1 is "backloaded," that is, the
present value of new pension benefits earned is s much larger
proportion of salary in the later years than in the earlier
years. Table 1 shows that even in the tenth year of employment
the present value of the new benefit earned is only .98% of
salary and the cumulative value of all benefits earned up to that
time is less than 5.88% of annual salary. Most benefits are
earned in the last ten years of employment.
This backloading is due to two factors: the tine value of,
money and inflation.The older the worker, the closer the date
of retirement, and therefore the higher the present value of an
additional dollar of pension benefits.












Figure 1 Present Value of New Benefits Earned as a Proportion of
Salary
Assumptions: The plan pays a benefit equal to 1% of final salary
per year of service. Plan participants enter the plan at age 25,
retire at age 65, and live until age 85. The employee's salary
grows at the rate of inflation, which is 5% per year. The






















VALUE OF PENSION LIABILITY
Figure 2. Cumulative Value of Benefits Earned
Salary
as a Proportion of
Assumptions: The plan pays a benefit equal to 1% of final salary
per year of service. Plan participAnts enter the plan at age 25,
retire at age 65, and live until age 85. The employee's salary
grows at the rate of inflation. The riskless real rate of
interest is 3% per year1 and the nominal rate used for
discounting nominal annuities is 9% per year.
12
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YEAS 0I SCL0Y%ENT 0 ! 4-ASS aTable 1. Present Value of New Benefits Earned as a Proportion of
Salary
Without With Fully Yearof Salary Salary Indexed
Employment Projection Projection Pension
1 .32% 2.12% 4.70%
10 .98 2.97 6.13
20 3.10 4.32 8.24
30 9.18 6.28 11.07
40 26.08 9.13 14.88
Steady state 6.40 4.82 8.86
Assumptions: The plan pays a benefit equal to 1% of final salary
per year of service. Plan participants enter the plan at age 25,
retire at age 65, and live till age 85. The employee's salary
grows at the rate of inflation. The riskiess real rate of
interest is 3% per year, and the nominal rate used for
discounting nominal annuities is 9% per year. The steady state
values asaume an equal age distribution of plan participants (age
range from 25 to 85).
Table 2. Cumulative Value of Benefits Earned as a Proportion of
Salary
Year of
Employment A50 P80 ISO
1 .32% 2.12% 4.70%
10 6.88 29.74 61.29
20 32.58 86.43 164.75
30 115.68 188.43 332.11
40 365.14 365.14 595.10
Steady State 128.33 155.84 247.66
Assumptions: Same as for Table 1.
13Inflation increases backloading for two reasons. First, it
increases the nominal rate of interest, thus accentuating the
time value of money factor already mentioned.. Second, given the
benefit formula and our assumption that salary increases at the
rate of inflation, inflation creates an indexation component in
the benefit earned each year. With each year of continued
employment, the present value of the benefit earned increases
both because the nuEber of years of service increases and because
the nominal salary base increases.
Because it is critical in understanding the distinction
between the ABO and the PBC, let us illustrate this "wage
indexation" effect in detail. suppose that you just turned 26
years old and have received a salary of $30,000. You have
therefore accrued a deferred pension annuity of $300 per year for
20 years starting 39 years from now when you retire. The present
value of this deferred annuityis $95. This is the ABC.
If you work f or another year, assuming inflation of 5%, you
will receive a salary of $31,500. The pension snnuity that you
are now entitled to is 2% of $31,500, or $630 per year starting
38 years from now. Thus the promised pension annuity has
increased by $330. By working for an additional year you have
earned an additional percentage point of salary for the
additional year of service ($315), and you have earned an
additional $15 by increasing the salary base for computing your
pension benefit. Had you not worked the additional year you
would have been entitled to only $300 per year at retirement.
14Thus, you have earned the $15 indexation increment to your
pension benefit through continued employment.
That this indexation increment to the pension benefit. can
only be achieved through continued employment is well understood
by plan participants facing the retirement decision. They will
often delay the date of retirement if they anticipate inflation
in the immediate future, in order to raise the salary base for
computing their pension benefit.
3.2 The Projected Benefit Obligation (P90)
By contrast, if the pension benefit were automatically
indexed for inflation up to the age of retirement, then
regardless of what happens in the future your projected pension
benefit after one year of service is $300 x l.05° or $2,112 per
year. The present value of this deferred annuity is$669.This
is the P90.
Notethat at retirement the ABO and the PBOhavethe same
value.7 They differ only in how much the sponsor is assumed to
owe the worker before retirement. The P80 would be the correct
7Note that if a plan sponsor makes contributions to the
pension fund each year equal to the amounts in the third column of
Table 1 (corresponding to the P50), then by the time the employee
reaches retirement the amount accumulated in the fund will equal
the amount necessary to pay the pension benefits (at the assumed
interest rate).The projected benefit method is therefore an
acceptable actuarial funding and costing method. (Winklevoss
1977). FAS 87 requires corporations to use this method to report
pension costs in their income statements. When used to determine
contributions it results in overfunding relative to the ABC
approach.
15number to use if benefits were tied to some index of prices or
wages up to the age of retirement independently of whether the
employee stays with the employer. Because private plans do not
offer such automatic indexation, it is a mistake to use the PRO
as the measure of what the sponsor has guaranteed.
3.3 The Indexed Benefit Obligation (180)
• The indexed benefit obligation or ISO is the present value
of the pension liability assuning indexation for inflation both
before and after retirement. Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 1 and 2
show that inflation indexation makes an enormous difference to
the value of pension benefits. Without indexation, at retirement
a plan participant would have benefits with a lump—sum equivalent
value of 3.65 times final salary. With indexation it would be
5.95 times final salary, an increase of 6fl.
Many economists argue that the 180 is the most appropriate
measure of a sponsor's pension obligation.0 They claim that
although there is no formal COLA, there is an implicit contract
between employer and employees that, in effect, guarantees the
real value of the pension benefits to workers who stay with the
fin. As evidence these economists have argued that workers
behave as if they believed that their pension benefit is indexed.
I do not find this argument persuasive. After all, workers
0See, for example, Cohn and Modigliani [1985] or Ippolito
(1986]. These economists think that belief in long-ten implicit
contracts between employer and employee imply this result.
16can be systematically mistaken about the value of their pension
benefits. Studies have shown,forexample, that 75% of Americans
think that Medicare provides long—term care insurance f or the
disabled elderly. It does not. These citizens are simply
mistaken. Indeed, I will argue in the next section that one of
the main reasons that employers do not offer automatic inflation
indexation is that workers are subject to a kind of money
illusion regarding their income replacement ratio in retirement.
I agree with those who think that there is usually an
implicit long—term contract between employees and employers who
offer DB plans. I also agree that the pension plan plays a part
in this isplicit contract and that the pension liability
therefore exceeds the ABO. The evidence to support this view is:
(1) employers make ad hoc benefit increases for retired
employees, and (2) employees are not usually fired just before
they become entitled to big increases in the value of their
accrued benefits due to early retirement options. It does not
follow, however, that the IBO or the PBOisthe correct measure
of the sponsor's pension liability or that they should be hedged
through the fund's investment policy.
What then is the nature of the implicit pension liability?
As I said earlier in this paper, I think that the 1DB pensions
offered to-salaried employees are best viewed as participating
annuities that offer a guaranteed minimum nominal benefit
determined by the plan's benefit formula. This benefit is
enriched from time to time at the discretion of management based
17on the financial condition of the plan sponsor, the increase in
the living costs of retirees, and the performance of the fund's
assets.
The implicit pension obligation is a very complex contingent
claim, both in the economic and legal sense, It seems clear
that if the sponsoring corporation does not do well financially,
then employees cannot expect to get anything more than the ABa.
There is mounting evidence that corporations facing severe
financial difficulties, either because of low profitability or
because they are under threat of hostile takeover, will raid
their overfunded pension plans and give employees only the legal
minimum (that is, the ABO).'
on the other hand, if the corporation does well financially,
and if retired employees face inflation, then there is evidence
that the corporation will help them out with ad hoc benefit
increases. It is for this reason that I have referred to this
type of pension benefit as a participating annuity with a
guaranteed floor.
'See, for exanpie, VanDerhei (1989), Petersen (1989), and
pontiff, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1989).
184.Why Pension Plans Do Not Provide Inflation Insurance
Whyaren'tpension plans designed to offer automatic
indexation for inflation? One reason frequently cited in the
past was that plan sponsors had no way to hedge the risk through
an appropriate investment strategy.'°
While it is true that in the past there have been no
financial instruments offering a risk-free real rate of return in
the U.S., had there been a demand for them by pension funds there
is little doubt that they would have come into existence.
Indeed, recently several financial institutions have introduced
financial instruments linked to the CPI. Their success or
failure will put the "lack of inflation hedge" explanation to the
test in the next several years.'1
Another explanation is that people already have enough
inflation insurance. Most notably Social Security retirement
benefits are indexed to wages during the preretirement years and
to the CPI after retirement. Furthermore much personal saving
takes the form of investment in residential real estate, which
while not riskless, is probably hedged against inflation risk.'2
Pension planners seem convinced that plan participants are
not willing to pay for inflation insurance through salary
'°This explanation, however, raises the question of why
integrated DB plans insure against Social Security risk even though
they have no apparent way of hedging that risk through an
appropriate investment strategy.
"see Bodie [1988J.
'SeeMartin Feldstein [1983] and Lawrence Summers (1983].
19reduction whether explicitly or implicitly. The way these
pension profeSsionals see it, offering inflation insurance under
a DB plan with no offsetting reductions in the benefit formula
would increase pension costs for younger employees. This is
precisely the group that is least likely to place much value on
pension benefits in general and on inflation insurance in
particular. For young people, retirement income (such a long way
away) is so heavily discounted that variations in inflation rates
may have only second-order effects on saving for retirement now.
Finally, there is money illusion. In economies where the
rate of inflation is not too high, people mistakenly treat
nominal values as if they were real. Even professional financial
planners often fall into the trap of treating nominal annuities
as if they were real for retirement planning purposes.
A rule of thumb used by many financial planners and benefits
specialists to judge the adequacy of retirement income is the
following: add expected Social Security benefits and expected
pension benefits and compare their sum to preretirement income.
If this so—called Irreplacement ratio" is greater than 80% you
will have adequate retirement income and do not need to
supplement it with other retirement saving.
This approach ignores the effect of post—retirement
inflation on pension benefits, and therefore can lead to
inadequate saving for retirement. For example, imagine that you
are 45 years old, and you work for a firm that has a defined
benefit pension plan that offers you a benefit equal to 1.5% of
20final pay times the number of years of service. Your salary is
now $50,000 per year, and you do not expect it to grow in real
terms.
By the time you retire you will have worked for the company
40 years, and your pension benefit will therefore be 60% of your
final salary or $30,000 per year. You expect Social Security to
provide a benefit of $10,000 per year, so your expected combined
retirement income is $40,000 and your replacement ratio 80%.
Now suppose inflation is 5% per year. At that rate prices
double roughly every 14 years. Your Social Security benefit has
a COLA (cost of living adjustment), so it will increase in tandem
with inflation. But your pension benefit does not. The $30,000
of pension income which may have been adequate when you retired
will have half of its original purchasing power when you are half
way through retirement. If you are fortunate enough to live 28
years past the retirement age, your pension benefit will be worth
only one quarter of its original value.
The situation I have just described is the norm rather than
the exception. Very few retirement planning professionals
currently pay more than lip service to the problem of post-
retirement inflation. They routinely ignore it in calculations
of income replacement ratios. -
Thisreplacement ratio fallacy may lead employees to
mistakenly think that a defined benefit plan with a final average
pay formula offers them more inflation protection than it really
does. What incentive does an employer have to incur the costs of
21offering inflation protection to employees who are already
behaving as though they had it? By raising the issue, the
employer might alert the employees to a previously unnoticed
inadequacy in their benefits package and cause discontent.
5.Who Owns the Pension Surplus?
If a corporate pension fund has an ABO that exceeds the
market value of its assets, FAS 81 requires that the corporate
sponsor recognize the unfunded liability on its corporate balance
sheet. If, however, the pension assets exceed the ABO, the
corporate sponsor cannot include the surplus on its balance
sheet.
This asymmetric accounting treatment expresses a widely held
view among pension professionals that as guarantor of the accrued
pension benefits, the sponsoring corporation is liable for
pension asset shortfalls but does not have a clear right to the
entire surplus in case of pension overfunding. Recent court
rulings in cases of terminations of overfunded plans have left
unclear how much of the surplus belongs to the plan sponsor, but
it is clearly less than lOO%.
There is one way that the corporation's shareholders can get
the entire pension fund surplus, but it takes time. This is by
'3Early papers on pension finance by Sharpe [19761 and Treynor
[l97.7 assumed that the pension trust was essentially an asset of
the sponsoring corporation. Bulow and Scholes [1983], however,
argue convincingly that the corporation's shareholders and the plan
beneficiaries actually share ownership.
22reducing the level of funding in the future. Thus while the
corporation may own less than 100% of the pension fund surplus in
the short run, in the long run it can take it all.
The implicit contract that we discussed in the previous
section can be viewed as a form of employee ownership share in
the pension fund surplus.
6.The Corporate Pension Guarantee and Funding and Investment
Strategies.
The asymmetry between the treatment of pension deficits and
surpluses creates an incentive for pension plan sponsors to
pursue an investment policy of ismunizing their pension
liabilities. We can clarify the issues with a simple example.
Imagine a corporation that has a defined benefit pension
plan. The only liability on the pension fund balance sheet is
the ABO (B). The situation is displayed in Table 3. These
balance sheets differ from conventional accounting ones in that
we have explicitly included the corporate sponsor's guarantee of
the ABO (G} as both an asset of the pension fund and a liability
of the corporation.
The pension fund net worth (5) is the difference between its
total assets —investmentsplus corporate pension guarantee (I-4-G)
-andthe ABO. The corporation owns a proportion, 0, of the
pension fund net worth; the remainder (1—0) belongs to the
employees. The shareholders' equity in the corporation (E) is
the difference between total corporate assets (conventional plus
23the corporation's share of the pension fund surplus, A +S)and
corporate debt (conventional plus the guarantee of the ABO, D +
G).
Let us consider several cases differing with respect to the
funding status of the pension plan, First consider the case of a
completely unfunded pension plan (that is, I =0,G =B,and S =
0).In this case the pension fund's investments are zero, and
the only pension fund asset is the corporate guarantee, which is
equal in value to the ABO. The pension fund net worth is zero.
This case is illustrated in Table 4.
what is the effect of funding? That depends on the source
of the funds and what they are invested in. Let us assume that
the corporation borrows on corporate account to fund the plan and
invests the money in the bonds issued by other corporations.
This leaves the corporation's total debt, as conventionally
measured, unchanged.
24Table 3. sample Corporation Balance Sheets
a. Corporate Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilitiesand Owners) EauJ.tv
ConventionalAssets A conventional Debt U
Corporate share of pension Corporate guarantee of ABC G
fundnet worth 05Shareholders Equity E
b. Pension Fund Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Investments IAccumulated benefits B
Corporate guarantee of ABC G Net Worth S
Table 4. Case of Unfunded Pension Plan
a. Corporate Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities and owners' Emtitv
Conventional Assets A Conventional Debt D
Corporate share of pension Corporate guarantee of ABCB
fund surplus oshareholdersEquity E
b. Pension Fund Balance Sheet
Assets LJ.abilities and Net Worth
Investments 0Accumulated benefits B
Corporate guarantee of ABC GNet worth 0
25In the absence of tax effects, G should go down and D and I
should each go up by the amount of funding. S will be zero as
long as I is less than or equal to B. Therefore funding the plan
and investing in bonds will have no effect on shareholder wealth
regardless of the size of the ownership share of employees in the
pension fund surplus. This leads to the following proposition
regarding pension funding:
Proposition I; Ignoring taxes and assuming that the money is
invested in assets that match the pension
liability, funding the pension plan will not
affect the value of shareholders' equity.
Of course, overfunding the plan will result in a positive
pension surplus (S >0).If the employees have some claim to the
pension surplus (' c 1), then shareholder wealth will decline as
the degree of funding increases.
What is the effect of altering the pension fund asset mix?
Letusassume that the plan is exactly fully funded (I =B).
Then G and S are zero only if the fund invests 100% in bonds
whose cash flows are matched to the pension liabilities. If
there is a mismatching of pension investments with the ABO, then
the corporate pension guarantee will have some value, and the
market value of the pension fund net worth will be positive.
The riskier the pension fund investment portfolio, the higher
will be the values of C and S.
26If the corporation owns the entire pension fund surplus (0
1), the pension fund asset mix will not affect the market value
of corporate shareholders' equity. This is because G is a
corporate liability, and all of S is a corporate asset. From a
shareholder wealth perspective the corporate pension guarantee
cancels outY
Propositon II; In the absence of corporate income taxes and
assuming the corporation owns the entire pension
fund net worth, the pension fund asset mix does
-
notaffect the value of shareholders' equity.
If, however, the fin's shareholders own less than 100% of
the pension fund net worth, then an increase in the riskiness of
the pension assets may reduce the market value of shareholders'
equity.
The corporate guarantee of the ABC (0) is in effect a put
option on the investments of the pension fund with an exercise
price equal to the present value of the ABC. To see this,
imagine that the plan is terminated. Formally, the payoff
structure at the date of termination is: Max {0, B —I).
Just as the corporate pension guarantee is analogous to a
put option, the pension fund net worth (5) is analogous to a call
option. Its payoff structure at the date of termination is:
"see Sharpe f1976]and Treynor (1977] for a discussion of this
special case.
27Max (0, I —B).From the pension fund balance sheet we know that
the net worth Is always identically equal to:
S=I+G-B
In the literature on options this is known as the put-call parity
relationship.
A well-known result in the theory of option pricing is that
if the volatility of the underlying security's price increases,
then the put and the corresponding call option will both increase
in value by the sane amount. In the case of a defined benefit
pension fund thi values of C and S increase with the volatility
of the difference between the ABC and the pension fund's
investments.
6.1 Immunization and Duration Matching
one way to minimize this cast to the corporation's
shareholders is to inmunizs the pension liability through an
investment strategy of duration matching. For example, suppose
we can characterize the finn's pension liability as a perpetual
annuity. suppose further that the term structure of interest
rates is flat.
The duration of this liability is (l-i-y)Jy years, where y is
the level of interest rates. By investing in a bond or other
fixed income securities with this same duration, the corporation
can insure that the value of its pension assets will always equal
the value of the pension liability. A simple way to do this
would be to invest in zero coupS bonds with a maturity of
23(l+y)/y years. As y changes and as the bonds in the pension fund
portfolio mature, management has to continuously readjust the
portfolio to maintain a duration equal to (l+y)/y.
The pursuit of duration matching strategies by pension funds
has created a demand for fixed income instruments with a
guaranteed duration. The innovations of the past 10 years like
zero coupon bonds, CMO's, interest rate swaps, and interest rate
futures contracts can be viewed, at least in part, as the market
response to this demand. They are all ways of eliminating
duration uncertainty Iron traditional bonds and mortgages.
6.2 Pension Overfunding and Contingent Immunization
If the corporation's management wants to maximize
shareholder wealth, why should they choose to fund the pension
plan and why should they invest in anything but securities that
exactly hedge the ABO liability? There are at least four reasons
why fins fund their defined benefit pension plans.
First, there are minimum standards imposed by law. The
purpose of these standards is to insure the promised pension
benefits against the risk of default by the corporate sponsor and
to protect the government (and therefore the taxpayer) from abuse
of the insurance provided by the government. Recent changes in
the law have made the insurance premium charged by the PBGC a
function of the degree of underfunding and eliminated the
possibility of voluntary termination of an underfunded pension
29Second, there are big tax incentives for plan sponsors to
fund their DB plans. Black [1980] and Tepper [1981] have shown
that the tax advantage derived from a defined benefit pension
plan stems from the ability of the sponsor to earn the pretax
interest rate on pension investments. In order to maximize the
value of this tax shelter it is therefore necessary to invest
entirely in assets offering the highest pretax interest rate.
Because under the IRS code in the U.S. dividends from invsstments
in common and preferred stock are taxed at a much lower rate than
interest on bonds, corporate pension funda should invest entirely
in taxable bonds and other fixed income investments. Recent
changes in the.tax laws have reduced the ability of pension plans
to overfund, but sponsors are still allowed to make additional
tax—qualified contributions as long es pension assets are less
than 150% of the ABO.16
Third, funding its pension plan provides the sponsoring
corporation with financial "slack" that can be used in case of
possible financial difficulties the firm may face in the
future.'7 Because the law still allows plan sponsors facing
financial distress to draw upon excess pension assets by reduced
'5see Utgoff [1988].
'6The relevent law is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1987.
175ee Bodie et al (1987] for a more complete discussion of the
financial slack motive for funding a pension plan.
30funding or, in the extreme case, voluntary plan termination1 the
pension fund can effectively serve as a tax—sheltered contingency
fund for the corporation.
Finally, PSGC insurance covers only a portion of the
promised benefits for the highly compensated plan participants,
Funding provides a cushion of safety for this group, which
includes top corporate management.'
If the pension fund is overfunded, then a 100% fixed income
portfolio is no longer required to minimize the cost of the
corporate pension guarantee. Management can invest surplus
pension assets in equities provided it reduces the proportion so
invested when the market value of pension assets comes close to
the value of the ADO. Suöh an investment strategy is known as
portfolio insurance or contingent immunization.
The pursuit by pension funds of portfolio insurance
strategies has created a market for index options and futures
contracts. The implementation of these strategies is feasible
without these derivative securities, but their existence makes
implementation less costly and less disniptive to the activities
of portfolio managers.'°
7.Pension Fund Investment Policy in Practice.
'See Light and Perold [1927) for a more complete discussion
of this point.
'9Leland and Rubinstein (1988) have described how the emergence
of a market for stock index futures made their ideas for portfolio
insurance commercially viable.
31Mow do corporate pension funds actually invest their money?
The stylized facts are that there is no significant difference
between DB and DC plans in the overall asset mix. Regardless of
plan type there is a clear tendenôy to invest between 40 to 60%
of assets in equities and the remainder in fixed income
securities.20
If the only goal guiding corporate pension policy is
shareholder wealth maximization then it is hard to understand why
the pension fund would invest in equities at all. A policy of
100% bonds would both maxinize the tax adwantage of funding the
pension plan and minimize the cost of guaranteeing the defined
benefits.
This suggests that there are other reasons why pension funds
invest a large fraction of their money in equities. Among the
possibilities are:
• Oorporate management views the pension plan as a trust for
the employees and manages fund assets as if it were a
defined contribution plan with a guaranteed floor specified
by the benefit formula. In doing so, it balances the goal
of shareholder wealth maximization againet the goal of
employee welfare maximization.
• Management has a mistaken view of the nature of the
guaranteed benefit and thinks that the best way to hedge it
is with a portfolio that contains a large proportion in
20See Greenwich Research Associates [1988].
32equities.
Management believes that through superior market timing and
security selection it is possible to create va].ue in excess
'of management fees and expenses. This is usually stated as
reducing pension costs through superior investment
performance.
Many executives in nonfinancial corporations are used to
creating value in excess of cost in their businesses. They
assume that it can also be done in the area of portfolio
management. Of course, if that is true then one must ask why
they do not do it on corporate account rather than in the pension
fund. That way they could have their tax shelter "cake" and eat
it too.
-Inother words, many executives do not believe in the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). Note, however, that there is
a growing trend particularly among large pension plans to engage
in indexing of both the fixed income and equity portfolios. This
is evidence that the sponsors of these plans believe that even if
there are opportunities to beat the market, the fees of those
portfolio managers who can do it consume any surplus earned.
While all three explanations have an element of truth to
them, I believe that the first is the most important one.
Management views the pension fund as a trust for the employees
and is trying to manage the assets so as to maximize employee
welfare subject to the constraint that the cost of providing the
benefit guarantee is minimal.
33Such a policy could lead an overfunded pension plan to
invest in equities. But it would also dictate that a fin should
reduce the proportion of its portfolio invested in equities if
the degree of overfunding falls. In other words, it should
pursue a policy of portfolio insurance or contingent
immunization.
Recent trends in pension asset allocation are broadly
consistent with this explanation. Some pension funds pursue
portfolio insurance strategies openly, often using stock index
futures. Others acconplish a similar result through stop-loss
orders and similar trading techniques in the stocks themselves.
The widespread practice of writing covered call options can
also be interpreted as evidence that pension funde want to
convert some of their investment in corporate equities into debt.
By writing a call option on an appropriate stock market index, a
pension fund can effectively transform a portfolio of stocks into
a portfolio of corporate bonds maturing at the expiration date of
the option.2'
Berkowitz and Logue (1986) found that the average risk-
adjusted performance of ERISA plans from 1968 to 1983 was lower
than returns experienced by other diversified portfolios in U.S.
financial markets. This could be interpreted as evidence that
they pursue contingent immunization strategies. Under this
interpretation the difference in their average return is in
21See the appendix for a more complete explanation of how this
transformation is accomplished.
34effect the insurance premium. Berkowitz and Logue also found
that there was more reallocation between stocks, bonds and cash
equivalents in DB pension plans than in the control group. This
too can be interpreted as evidence of portfolio insurance
practices.
Zn cross-sectional studies of pension asset allocation we
would expect to find that the proportion of fund assets invested
in equities would be positively related to plan overfunding.
Friedman (1983) found no significant correlation between the
allocation of defined benefit plan assets and the funding status
of the plan. Bodie et al (1987) confined this finding. In both
of these studies, however, the unit of observation was the
corporation rather than individual plans. since many
corporations have several plans, some of which are overfunded
(usually the ones for salaried employees) and some underfunded,
it could be that the effect we are looking for is obscured at the
level of the fin.
Recent changes in accounting rules (FAS 87) and tax law are
likely to reinforce the strategy of immunization. As a result of
FAS 87 corporate officers concerned with the adverse impact of an
unfunded ABO on the corporate balance sheet will have a greater
incentive than before to hedge against interest rate risk.
Two of the provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987 (OBRA) are relevant. The first is the strengthening
of the claim of the PBGC on corporate assets for underfunded
pension plans. This will eliminate some of the incentive for
35such corpàrations to take risks with the assets in the pension
plan and therefore increase the proportion invested in fixed
income securities.
The second relevant provision of OBRA is the imposition of
strict funding limits on pension plans. If pension plans
gradually become less overfunded, the cost of providing benefit
guarantees will become more sensitive to the proportion they
invest in equities. They will therefore have an incentive to
invest more in fixed income securities.
8.Financial Innovation as a Response to the Investment Demands
of Pension Funds
Most of the innovations in the fixed income securities
markets since the early 1970's have been in response to an
underlying increase in the level and volatility of interest rates
and the desire to hedge against the risks created thereby.22
These interest rate developments were triggered largely by the
inflationary trend that began in the late 1960's.
Figure 1 shows the history of the 10 year moving average
inflation rats and the interest rate on 10 year Treasury bonds
from 1958 to 1988. If we interpret the moving average of paat
inflation rates as a proxy for the expected rate of inflation, we
-can explain the trend in long—term interest rates almost sntirely
on the basis of the trend in expected inflation.
2¼ee Smith and Taggart (1989).
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Figure 3. InflatIon and Interest Rates: 1958—1988
Notes: The inflation rate is a 10 year moving average of the
annual change in the CPI-U.
Source:For the 10 year Treasury bond interest rateEcono2ic
Report of the President 1989, Table B—il.
For the rate of inflation —Bureauof Labor Statistics.
37The initial response to the high and unpredictable interest
rates of the early 1970's was the emergence of an active market
for floating rate debt as both borrowers and lenders shied away
from long—term commitments at fixed rates. Smith and Taggart
(1989) point to Citicorp's $850 million issue in 1974 as the key
development in this area. Many bond market analysts were
predicting a permanent shortening of the maturity structure of
fixed rate debt and a complete transition to floating rate
corporate debt and adjustable rate mortgagee. The last thing
they imagined was a surge in the exact opposite direction.
But then came ERISA. In 1974 Congress passed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act and in one bold stroke transformed
the structure of institutional demand for fixed income
securities. The critical features of ERISA for the capital
markets were its codification of the legal status of corporate
defined benefit pension obligations and its imposition of minimus
funding requirements. The new age of bond immunization and
duration matching began.
The demand for long duration fixed-income securities was not
new. Life insurance companies always had an investment demand
for long—term fixed—income securities to hedge their whole-life
and annuity products. But consumer demand for these products
went into eclipse in the 1970's because of the inflationary bulge
and resulting high interest rates. Sales of new policies fell
sharply, and loans to policy—holders at contractual interest
rates as low as 4% peryear were siphoning funds away at a
38frightening pace.
Eventually, the environment of inflation and interest rate
uncertainty of the 1970's led the insurance industry to innovate
in the retail market of the 1980's. They designed universal life
and variable life insurance policies offering interest rates that
were both higher and more adjustable than those embodied in
traditional whole—life policies. Joining forces with mutual
funds, the life insurance industry also started offering insured
savings plans that allowed a broader spectrum of investment
instruments, including money market funds and common stocks.
Thus retail demand in the insurance market has led to a
shortening of the maturity structure of life insurance company
investments *
Thenew demand for long-duration fixed income securities has
come primarily from pension funds. Life insurance companies have
played an important role in this market both by directly assuming
pension fund liabilities and by providing guaranteed investment
contracts (GIC's) to pension funds, GICts are essentially zero
coupon bonds issued by insurance companies, who hedge the
liability by investing in fixed income securities. Insurance
companies thus have become an additional layer of financial
intermediation. Their demand for long—duration debt securitiea
is ultimately derived from the demand by pension funds.
While the immunization strategies of pension funds have
spurred innovation in the fixed income securities markets,
pension fund contingent immunization and portfolio insurance
39strategies have created a market for options and financial
futures contracts. The implementation of these strategies is
feasible without these derivative securities, but their existence
makes implementation less costly and less disniptive to the
activities of portfolio managers.
Pension fund involvement in writing covered call options has
also been an important factor contributing to the growth of stock
options markets. As explained before, buying stocks and writing
call options on them is similar to investing in fixed—income
securities, pension funds that write call options on stocks or
stock indexes sre in effect converting some of their investment
in equities into short—term fixed-income investments.
9.Future Innovations.
As people rely more and nore on pensions and private savings
to provide their retirement income, there will surely be an
increasing demand on the financial system to provide suitable
products. The existing array of life annuities offered by life
insurance companies and pension plans has one major shortcoming:
the lack of protection against inflation.23
Until recently there was no simple way for investors to
completely hedge inflation risk in the U.S. capital market.2
23See Bodie [1989b and 1989c].
24$ee Bodie [1989]
40Recently, however, several financial institutions have issued
securities linked to the U.S. consumer price level. The new
securities were issued firet by the Franklin Savings Association
of Ottawa, Kansas, in January 1988 in two different forms.
The first is certificates of deposit, called Inflation—Plus
COs, insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), and paying an interest rate tied to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer Price Index (CPI). Interest
is paid monthly and is equal to a stated real rate plus the
proportional increase in the CPI during the previous month. As
of this writing (May 1989), the real rate ranges from 3% per year
for a one—year maturity CD to 3.2% per year for a ten—year
maturity.
The second form is twenty—year noncallable collateralized
bonds, called Real Yield Securities or REALs. These offer a
floating coupon rate of 3% per year plus the previous year's
proportional change in the CPI, adjusted and payable quarterly.
A recent issue of similar bonds includes a put option.
Two other financial institutions have recently followed the
lead of Franklin Savings.25 If the trend continues, we have
reached a milestone in the history of this country's financial
markets. For years prominent economists at all points of the
251n August 1988 Anchor Savings Bank became the second U.S.
institution to issue REALs, and in September 1988 3814 Acceptance
Corporation issued modified index—linked bonds subject to a nominal
interest rate cap of 14% per annum. The investment banking firm
of Morgan Stanley and Company is the underwriter and market maker
for REALs.
41ideological spectrum have argued that the U.S. Treasury should
issue such securities, and scholars have speculated why private
markets for them have not hitherto developed.26 The current
innovative environment in the U.S. financial markets appears to
finally have put an end to thie speculation by producing private
indexed bonds in several forms.
From the perspective of this paper what is interesting about
these developments is that savings institutions have undertaken
to offer this insurance against inflation risk without having a
way of completely hedging that risk through their investment
policy. The owners of these institutions are bearing the
inflation risk through their own capital.
This is a viable situation for small amounts of inflation
insurance. Should the demand grow, however, it seems clear that
the additional supply of price—indexed securities would have to
come from the nonfinancial sector.
One promising source of CPI—linked investments for an
inflation insurance intermediary is CM-linked home mortgages.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is
about to certify a variety of price—level-adjusted mortgages
(PLANs) for Federal Housing Administration approval (FHA). There
is reason to believe that once FHA mortgage insurance is
available and the tax status of PLANs is clarified, they could
account for a significant portion of new lending in the home
2tSée, for example, the analysis in Fischer (1986).
42mortgage market.27
Nonfinancial businesses have shown some willingness to issue
debt securities that are indexed to the prices of their output.
A financial intermediary could pool such bonds in order to
synthesize an investment that hedges annuities indexed to broader
price indexes.2S
With a large market for price-indexed securities and their
derivatives, pension plan sponsors and other financial
institutions could then offer annuities with inflation insurance
features. Sponsors who already offer their employees several
investment options for their supplementary savings plans can
simply expand the set of alternatives to include CPI—linked
securities.
Merton (1983] has proposed a more radical innovation.
Instead of indexing retirement annuities to the cost-of—living,
he suggests indexing them to aggregate per capita consumption.
His proposal is based on a model of lifetime household optimizing
behavior that suggests that such consumption—indexed annuities
might enhance welfare considerably. Merton envisions a major
role for the government in making this type of product possible.
In view of the innovative atmosphere in the U.S. financial
markets in recent years, however, it is conceivable that the
private sector can manage it without help from the government.
27See Modigliani and Lessard [1975] for a discussion of these
mortgage designs.
28See Blinder [1976).
43io.. Summary and Conclusions
Pension funds have played a critical role in the evolution
of the markets for debt and equity securities and their
derivatives in the U.S. over the last 15 years. The new
securities and markets can largely be explained as responses to
the investment demands of pension funds in an environment of
increased interest rate volatility and tighter regulation.
Defined benefit pension plans offer annuities that have a
guaranteed floor specified by the benefit formula. In order to
minimize the cost to the sponsor of providing this guarantee,
there is a strong incentive to invest an amount equal to the
present value of the accumulated benefit obligation in fixed-
income securities with a matching duration. The pursuit of
duration matching and related immunizatipn strategies by pension
funds has contributed to tha emergence and rapid growth of
markets for zero coupon bonds, GIC's, CMOs, options, and
financial futures contracts. Recent changes in accounting rules
(FAS 87) and tax law (OBRA) are likely to reinforce the use of
immunization strategies.
One way to predict financial innovations is to forecaet the
future hedging demands of pension funds and other institutions
catering to the retirement income needs of our aging population.
If inflation risk becomes a major concern, then it is likely that
financial intermediaries like pension funds and life insurance
companies will respond by providing annuities that offer better
inflation—protection.
44Appendix; Using Derivative Securities to Convert Equity into
Debt.
The purpose of this appendix is to show how derivative
securities like forward contracts and options can be used to
convert a portfolio of common stocks into a bond. To keep the
exposition simple we will assume the portfolio is a single stock
that pays no dividends, and we will assume that options on the
stock are of the European type and therefore can only be
exercised at expiration.
Suppose you are holding a share of XYZ stock with a current
price of S. Now consider a forward contract on the stock with a
forward price of X payable T years from now. Because the
contract commits you to hand over the stock P years from now in
exchange for X dollars, you can convert the stock into a zero
coupon bond maturing in T years by selling such a forward
contract. In other words, a combination of the stock plus a
short position in the forward contraot is equivalent to a zero
coupon bond.
Instead of selling a forward contract, suppose you sell a
call option with an exercise price of X. The call option is
similar to the forward contract in that if T years from now the
stock price exceeds X, you will have to hand over the stock in
exchange for X dollars. The call option differs from the forward
contract in that if at the expiration date the stock price is
less than X, the option will not be exercised and you will be
left with the stock.
45The combination of the XYZ stock and a short position in the
call option is therefore similar to a zero coupon xz bond with
default risk. The analogy with default risk is that if XYZ
Corporation were to default on its debt, then its unsecured
bondholders would become stockholders. If the exercise price, X,
is far below the current stock price, s, then the call option is
very likely to be exercised. In our analogy, this would
correspond to the default risk on the bond being very low.
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